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This paper discusses, estimates and compares some microeconometric models for simultaneous discrete 
endogenous variables.  The models  are based  on the assumption that observed  endogenous variables 
represent the outcome of a static discrete game. I discuss models based on non-cooperative equilibrium 
concepts (Nash, Stackelberg), as well as models which presume Pareto optimality of observed outcomes. 
The models are estimated using  data on the joint  labor force participation decisions  of husbands and 
wives in a sample of Dutch households. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
During  the  last  two  decades  models  for  qualitative  and  limited  dependent  variables  have 
evolved  from subjects  on the frontier  of  econometrics to well-established  and widely  used 
research tools. This is witnessed not only by the existence of several reviews on the subject but 
also by the availability of  numerous computer packages for estimation. 
In  addition  to univariate  and  multivariate  models,  simultaneous  equations models  for 
discrete and limited dependent variables have been proposed. An example is the simultaneous 
probit model: 
y 1*  = xtP1+ 7lY2 + El  (la) 
yz*= xtP2  + YZVlf  E2  (lb) 
yi=1 if  y*>0,  i=1,2  (1~) 
0 otherwise 
Models like (1) were introduced as being the ostensibly natural adaptations of the classical 
linear simultaneous equations model to discrete endogenous variables. However, a well-known 
difficulty with model (1) and similar models is that they require some coherency restriction on 
parameters in order to be statistically meaningful. The root of the coherency problem is that 
the relationship between (el, €2)  and (yl,  y2) defined by model (1) is not one to one. For model 
(1)  the coherency  condition  is  7172 = 0,  which  essentially eliminates  simultaneity from the 
model (see e.g. Heckman, 1978). 
In applications where the discrete endogenous variables represent actions of two agents, y* 
can often be interpreted as the difference between the utility player i attaches to y; = 1 and the 
utility attached to yi = 0, given yj, i.e. given the action of  player j (i # j). Therefore if the 
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utility player  i derives from each of the four possible combinations of actions is denoted by 
u'(YI,Y~), we  have y1*= ~'(1,~2) ul(O,yz)and yz*= u2(yl,  1) - - u2(yl,0). 
Bjorn  and  Vuong  (1984, 1985) noted  that given  this  utility  interpretation  of  the  latent 
variables,  one can use the Nash or Stackelberg equilibria of  a game between  the two agents 
to  relate  the  latent  variables  to the  observed  discrete  variables,  rather  than  using  (lc). 
Although  their  papers  present  an  interesting  generalization  of  traditional  discrete  choice 
models,  the  equilibrium  concepts  they  adopted  suffer  from the  fact  that  they  may  yield 
allocations which are not Pareto optimal. Especially in applications to household behaviour, 
it  seems  more  appropriate to employ  an equilibrium concept  which  yields  Pareto optimal 
outcomes  only.  Recently,  Bresnahan  and  Reiss  (1991) have  discussed  identification  and 
estimation issues of  a much wider  range of  models of  discrete games,  including sequential- 
moves games, co-operative games and games with mixed strategies. 
The present  paper  actually estimates  some models  of discrete  games employing  data on 
household  labour  force  participation.  Both  co-operative and  nonco-operative  equilibrium 
concepts are used.  The paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section  2  presents  the econometric 
models,  based on four different equilibrium concepts. Section 3  discusses and compares the 
estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF SOME DISCRETE GAMES 
Consider two players who each can take one of two actions. The action player i (i= m,fl takes 
is denoted by a dummy variable yi. The utility player i derives from each of the four possible 
combinations of actions is denoted by U' (Y,~, yf).  (In the sequel a combination of actions will 
be  called  an  allocation.)  The  preferences  of  the  ith  player  in  this  model  are completely 
characterized by the ranking of his/her four utility levels. For each player 4! different rankings 
are possible.  Therefore  for the two  players  there are (4!12= 576  possible  combinations  of 
utility rankings. 
For empirical implementation, we  parameterize  the utility levels as follows: 
Specification (2)  follows McFadden's  random utility hypothesis.  It decomposes u~(~~, y2) 
into  a  deterministic  component  which  depends  upon  a  vector  x  of  observed  exogenous 
variables, and a random component E which follows some probability distribution; the a's and 
0's are fixed parameters (see e.g. McFadden,  1981). Specification (2)assumes that the change 
in utility of player i caused by a change of action of player j does not depend on x; for example 
Um(l, 1) - Um(l  ,0) = a  in  and  uf(l,o)-uf(O,O) = a{.  The  latter  assumption  reduces  the 
number of possible utility rankings per player from 24 to 6. For example, if a i" is positive and 
ao"is negative, then utility rankings with Um(l,l)- Um(l,O)< 0 and Um(O,l)- Um(O,O)> 0 
cannot  occur.  The  specification  of  constant terms  in  model  (2) is  similar  to that  in  the 
'simultaneous-move'  games as proposed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). 
In the sequel, the following additional notation will prove to be useful: 257  DISCRETE GAMES 
Given the preferences of both players, we can define an equilibrium concept. The aim of this 
is to attach an allocation to each combination of utility rankings. We will consider the Nash 
equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium, equilibria based on Pareto optimality only, and three 
mixtures  of  Pareto optimal equilibria and Nash  equilibria. The first two of these have been 
proposed earlier in Bjorn and Vuong (1984)and Bjorn and Vuong (1985),respectively. 
Model  1. Nash 
Each player is assumed to maximize his or her utility function, given the action of the other 
player.  Both players  then adjust their  actions until their  decisions are mutually consistent. 
More formally, allocation (k, I) is a Nash equilibrium if 
Urn( 1) > 1  - k  1)  and  uf(k, 1) > uf(k, 1 - 1)  k,1= 0,I 
Therefore,  the  Nash  equilibrium  (NE) is  determined  by  the  signs  of  the  following  utility 
differences (reaction functions): for player m: 
Um(l,l)- Um(O,l)= x'pm+ amem  and  Um(l,O)- Um(O,O)= x'pm+ em  (3a) 
and for player  f: 
uf(l,l)- uf(l,O)= x'pf  + af  + ef  and  uf(O,l)-uf(O,O) = x'pf  + ef  (3b) 
Table A1 in the Appendix gives the Nash  equilibria corresponding to each of  the sixteen 
possible  combinations of  signs  of  reaction  functions.  In  some cases  there  are two  Nash 
equilibria, whereas in others there does not exist a Nash equilibrium. In case of multiple equi- 
libria we assume, following Bjorn and Vuong (1984),that players choose one of the equilibria 
at random, such that each equilibrium is chosen with equal probabilities. If  there is no Nash 
equilibrium players are assumed to choose one of the four allocations with equal probabilities. 
As has been noted by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991),there are several other ways of responding 
to the nonuniqueness problem. One possibility is to treat some combination of outcomes as 
one event. However, if  the total number of outcomes is already small such an approach is not 
useful.  Another  possibility  is  to restrict  the  support  of  the  error  terms.  Basically,  this  is 
equivalent to assigning in an ad hoc way smaller or even zero probabilities to some outcomes 
and  larger  probabilities  to  others.  Given  that  the  models  offer  no  further  basis  for 
distinguishing  between multiple equilibria, we  feel that assuming random choice with  equal 
probabilities is  a natural  way  to proceed.  Nevertheless,  this assumption is  ad  hoc as well. 
Additional data, for example direct  information on each  player's  preferences,  is  needed  to 
investigate the validity of this assumption. Finally, it should be kept in mind that in all cases 
there is always a positive probability of the existence of pure strategies due to the parametric 
specification in model (2). 
From Table AI, the likelihood contributions can be derived straightforwardly (see Bjorn and 
Vuong, 1984). As will be clear from Table AI, only amand af  are identified, not a T", ar,  af 
and ad separately; the same holds true for the 0's. 
It is well known that the Nash  equilibrium is  generally not Pareto optimal. For example, 
consider  the  case  where  we  have  the  reaction  functions  Um(l,l)- Um(O,l)> 0  and 
Um(l  ,0) - Um(O,O)> 0  for player  m  and the reaction  functions  uf(l, 1) - uf(l  ,0) < 0  and 
uf(O,l)- uf(O,O) > 0 for player f. Then the NE is (1,0),but is it perfectly possible that (0,l) 
is  Pareto more efficient than (1,O). To determine whether this is the case, we would need to 258  P. KOOREMAN 
know  the  signs  of  Um(l  ,0) - Um(O,  1) = x'Pm -at  + em and  uf(l  ,o) - uf(O,l) = -xtfp + 
a6 - ef. However,  as noted earlier, ao" and a&are not identified in the Nash model. 
Model 2. Stackelberg 
In a Stackelberg game the role of the players is asymmetric.  One of the players (the leader), 
is  assumed  to maximize his or her  utility  anticipating the reaction of  the other player  (the 
follower). Formally, allocation (k, I) is a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) with player m being the 
leader and player f being the follower if 
uf(k, I) > uf(k, 1 -I)  and  Um(k,  I) > Um(l -k, I) 
1 - k, I) > uf(l - k, 1 -1) 
uf(k, I) > uf(k, 1 -I)  and  Um(k,  I) > Um(l -k, 1 - 1)
uf(l - k, I) < uf(l -k, 1 -I) 
Table A11 in the Appendix gives the Stackelberg equilibrium for all possible configurations. 
First  note that,  as  opposed  to the NE,  the Stackelberg  equilibrium (SE) is  always defined 
uniquely.  In the Stackelberg model  pm, a?  and ar are identified  for the leader m, whereas 
for the follower f only pf and af are identified. Like a NE, a SE need not be Pareto optimal. 
For example, consider the first case in Table AII, i.e.  uf(l,l) > uf(l,O),  uf(O,l) > uf(O,O) 
and Urn  (1,l) > Urn  (0,l). Here the SE (1, I), but (0,O) might be Pareto more efficient than (1,l). 
The likelihood  function is derived  along the same lines as in case of the NE (see Bjorn and 
Vuong,  1985). 
Model 3.  Pareto Optimality Only 
Allocation (k, I) is Pareto optimal if 
[Um(k,  I) > Um(k,  1 - I)  or uf(k, I) > uf(k, 1 - I)] 
and 
[Um(k,  I) > Um(l- k, I)  or uf(k, I) > uf(l -k, I)] 
and 
For the case a?  > 0, a? >0, a{  > 0 and a-f; > 0, Table A111  in the Appendix gives  the 
Pareto optimal allocations for each of the 36  possible combinations  of  utility  rankings.  In 
many cases several allocations are Pareto optimal. As before, we assume that the players then 
choose one of  the  Pareto optimal  allocations  at random,  such  that  each  Pareto optimal 
allocation is chosen with equal probabilities. 
From  Table AIII,  the likelihood  contributions  for the Pareto optimality  model  can be 
derived  straightforwardly.  For  example,  if  allocation  (0,O)  is  observed,  the  likelihood DISCRETE  GAMES 
contribution becomes: 
Pr(0,O) =4Pr [UE < UU;; < UZ < <;I;  and  ~$1 < ~$0 < U{O  < U{I] 
+ jPr [UE < U'i'l  < UZ < Ufl  and  ~$1 < U& < U{I  < U~O] 
+ jPr [UE < UYl  < UZ < U;I;  and  ~$1 < U~I < ~$0 < U{O] 
+ jPr [UE < UZ < U';1  < U;I;  and  ~$1 < U{I  < ~$0 < U~O] 
+ fPr  [UE < UZ < Uoml  < U';1  and  ~$1 < U.fl < U$O< u-~o] 
=3Pr[ern<-xfprn-a;f 	 and  -~'/3~--a{+a$<e~< -xfpf]  (4) 
+fPr[~~<  and  -xfpf-min(0,a{-a$)] -x'prn-a?  -X'@~-~<<E~< 
+3Pr[ern<  -X'/~~-CY;~ and  ef< -x'pf-a{] 
+f Pr[-x'prn-a?<  em<  -~'/3~-min(O,a'i'-af)  and  .sf< -xfpf-a{] 
$3 Pr[-x'prn- a;2+aOm < ern< -xfprn  and  ef < -xfpf-a{]. 
The second equality is based on specification (2). Note that some of the probability terms in 
model (4) may be zero, depending on the signs of a  i" -aOm  and a{ -a$. 
Model 4.  Mixed Pareto OptimalitylNash 
From the point of view of  predictability of  a model, a large number of cases with multiple 
solutions as in model 3 is undesirable. It seems reasonable to choose an equilibrium concept 
that minimizes the number of cases where multiple solutions arise, and when they arise, that 
produces as few solutions as possible. The following model uses the Nash principle to reduce 
the number of multiple Pareto optimal solutions. Three cases can be distinguished: 
Case I  (One Nash equilibrium). If  the game has exactly one NE and if  this NE is Pareto 
optimal, we  assume this to be the outcome of the game (see Example 1). 
Example 1. The unique Nash  equilibrium (0,l) is Pareto optimal 
If  the unique NE is not Pareto optimal, there exists exactly one allocation at which both 
players are better off as compared to the Nash equilibrium.'  The players are then assumed 
to choose this Pareto efficient allocation (see Example 2). 
Example 2. Allocation (1,l) is Pareto more eficient  than the NE (0,O) 
Case 2 (Two Nash equilibria). If the game has two Nash equilibria at least one of these will 
'Let  (k,l) be  a  Nash  equilibrium  (NE)  which  is  not  Pareto  optimal  (k,l=0,1).Because  it  is  a  NE  we  have 
Um(k,  I)  > Um(l-k,I)and uf(k,I)  > u1(k, 1 - I).Therefore the allocation at which both players are better off than 
at (k,  I)  must be (1 - k,  1 -I). 260  P. KOOREMAN 
be Pareto optimal.* If only one NE is Pareto optimal, we  assume this to be the outcome 
of the game (Example 3). 
Example 3. Two Nash equilibria ((1,l) and (0,O)); only (1,l) is Pareto optimal 
If both NE are Pareto optimal, the players are again assumed to choose one of these with 
equal probabilities (Example 4). 
Example 4. Two Nash equilibria ((1,O) and (O,l)), both Pareto optimal 
Case 3 (No Nash equilibrium).  If the game does not have a NE, there may be two, three 
or four Pareto optimal allocations (Examples 5, 6, and 7, respectively).  In such a case the 
players  are  assumed  to  choose  one  of  the  Pareto  optimal  allocations  with  equal 
probabilities. 
Urn(0,O)< Urn(1,0) < Urn(l,l)  < Urn(0,1) 
uf(0,l) < u~(o,o)< uf(l,0) < uf(l,l) 
Example 5. No Nash equilibrium; two Pareto optimal allocations ((1,I) and (0,l)) 
Example 6. No Nash equilibrium; three Pareto optimal allocations ((1,1), (0,l) and (1,O)) 
Example  7. No Nash equilibrium; all allocations Pareto optimal 
Suppose (k,I) is one of the two NE (k,I= 0,l).  Then we have 
um(k, I) > um(l-k,  I)  (F1) 
and 
uf(k, I) > uf(k, 1 - I)  (F2) 
so that the other NE must be (I -k,  1  -1).  This implies 
Um(l- k,1 -I) > Um(k, I  -1)  (F3) 
and 
uf(1-k,  1  -I) > uf(l  -k,  I)  (F4) 
Allocations  (1 - k,I) and (k,1  -I)  cannot be Pareto more efficient  that (k,I)  in  view  of equations (Fl)  and (F2), 
whereas (1 -k,  I)  and (k,1 - I)  cannot be Pareto more efficient than (1 -k,  1 - I)  in view of equations (F3)and (F4).If 
k  1) > 1  - k,  1 - I  i = m, f  (FS) 
then only (k,I) is Pareto optimal ((1 -k,  1 -1) if the inequality is reversed).  If 
(k, I) > 1  -k,  1 - I  and  (k, 1) < 1  -k,  1 - I)  i # j 
then both (k, I) and (1 -k,  1 - I) are Pareto optimal. DISCRETE GAMES 
Table I. Identifiability  of a's 
Nash  (a;" -a:),  (a(- a{) 
Stackelberg, male leader  a Ill, a:,  (a(- a{) 
Stackelberg, female leader  (a;"-a:),  a{, a{ 
Pareto optimality only  a;",  a:,  a(, a{ 
Mixed Pareto optimality/Nash  a?, a:,  a(, a{ 
For the case a?  > 0, aF  > 0, a{ > 0 and a6 > 0, Table AV  in the Appendix  gives the 
outcomes of the game for each of the 36 possible combinations of utility rankings. (Note that 
Examples 6 and 7 do not arise when all a's are positive.) In order to facilitate the derivation 
of Table AV, table AIV gives the corresponding Nash equilibria. 
Obviously, there are several other possibilities to define mixed  models. One example is to 
start from Pareto optimality and invoke the Nash property in case of multiple Pareto optimal 
allocations (see Table AVI). This yields a model which is identical to model 4, except for the 
case with  multiple Pareto optimal allocations  and a  single  Nash  equilibrium  which  is  not 
Pareto optimal (Example 2). In that case the Nash equilibrium cannot help to choose among 
the Pareto optimal allocations, so that one would make the equal probability assumption. We 
prefer the approach of model 4 since it yields fewer cases with multiple solutions. A second 
example is  to consider  outcomes that are both Pareto optimal and Nash equilibria with an 
equal probability treatment for the cases where there are many or no Pareto Nash allocations. 
However, this would  also yield more cases with multiple solutions than model 4 (see Table 
AVII). 
The identifiability of the a's is summarized in Table I. In all models, only  fim  and pf can 
be identified, not  pr,  Or,p{,  and  pi  separately. 
3. AN APPLICATION TO HOUSEHOLD LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
In this section the models described in Section 2 are estimated using data on the labour force 
participation of males and females in Dutch households. The data stem from a labour mobility 
survey in the Netherlands,  conducted in  1985. The sample contains 849 households. 
Since in the Netherlands (and in our sample) the proportion of  nonparticipating males is 
small, it seems more interesting to model the choice between working full-time and working 
part-time for males rather than their choice between working and not working at all. In our 
empirical analysis we therefore define the dependent variables  y,  and yf as 
y, 	 = 1 if  the male works at least 38 hours per  week 
= 0 if  the male works less than 38 hours per week 
y,=  1 if  the female works a positive number of hours per week 
= 0 if  the female does not work 
The 38 hours cut-off  point  is  motivated  by the fact that in the Netherlands  a full-time job 
usually stands for a working week of 38 hours. In the total sample of 849 households allocation 
(1,l) is observed in 249 cases, (1,O) in 377 cases, (0,l) in 82 cases, and (0,O) in 141 cases. Table 
I1 lists  the variables  that have  been  used  in the empirical analysis  and gives  some sample 
statistics. The education index ranges from 1 to 5, 1 representing the lowest and 5 the highest 262  P. KOOREMAN 
Table 11.  Sample statistics 
- -- 
Variable  Description  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max 
K6  1 if  the household contains at least one child  0.26  0.44  0  1 
younger  than 6,  0 otherwise 
FS:  #  of persons in the household  3.47  1.24  2  10 
WAGEM:  Wage rate of the male partner per week  15.61  5.72  5.14  59.5 
(in Dfl.) 
A GEM;  Age of the male partner  39.70  10.01  20  63 
EDUCM:  Education index of the male partner  2.78  1.08  1  5 




Age of the female partner 
ducati ion index of  the female partner  2.35  2.01  1  5 
NLINC:  Non-labour  income of the household  64.58  138.5  0  1054.1 
level of education. For nonparticipating persons the (potential) wage rate has been predicted 
on the basis of selectivity bias corrected wages equations. 
To specify the  set  of explanatory variables, preliminary estimates were  obtained using  a 
bivariate  probit  model.  In  the  male  participation  probit  equation  household  composition 
variables (K6 and FS) were found to be insignificant. Nonlabour income was insignificant in 
both the male  and female labour force participation  equation,  a  result  that appears to be 
common for Dutch data sets.  In both equations nonlinear wages effects were found for the 
own wage but not for the spouse's wage. On the basis of these results, we specified the set of 
explanatory variables in the game-theoretic models as shown in Table 111. 
The models have been estimated by maximum likelihood assuming that em  and ef follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances and correlation p. Since in the 
Nash model and in the preliminary probit results the estimate for the correlation coefficient 
p  was not significantly different  from zero, we estimated the other models with p = 0. 
Although the model based on Pareto optimality only is theoretically identified, its estimation 
suffered  from  a  lack  of  convergence  of  the  likelihood  maximization  algorithm.  The 
explanation is that there is a large number of multiple equilibria in this case (cf. Table AIII), 
in which  case one of the equilibria is  chosen at random.  Clearly, this reduces the role of 
explanatory variables. 
A dash in Table I11 indicates that the parameter  is not identified in that particular  model 
(see Section 2, Table I). 
As can be seen from equation (2) and Tables A1 and AV, the game-theoretic models collapse 
to the bivariate probit model if am= 0 and af= 0. Using likelihood ratio tests we find that the 
bivariate probit model is rejected against the Mixed model and both Stackelberg models, but 
not against the Nash model. The estimates for Dm  and Df  do not differ much across columns. 
Note that while the female wage rate does not have a significant influence on male preferences, 
the male wage rate has a significant negative effect on female preferences  for work. The own 
wage effects are nonlinear for both male and female partners. For most of the wives the own 
wage effect is positive. For a majority of the husbands it is negative, indicating that they are 
on the backward-sloping part of their labour supply curve. A part of the nonlinearity of the 
wage effects, however, may be the result of neglected endogeneity of the wage rates due to the 
tax system.  The estimates of  am  and af  show  some variation across  columns.  Note  that 
(significant) estimates of am  are negative whereas the estimates of afare positive. This implies 263  DISCRETE GAMES 
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that, ceteris paribus,  female participation makes the husband less inclined to work full-time, 
whereas (full-time) male participation makes females more inclined  to participate as well. 
In the absence of direct information on individual preferences, the differences between the 
various  models  are  basically  differences  in  the  functional  form.  A  way  to compare  the 
empirical performance in this case is to look at goodness-of-fit. Comparing the loglikelihood 
values,  i.e.  comparing  the  goodness-of-fit  in  terms  of  the  Kullback-Leibler  information 
criterion, we find that the Mixed model performs better than the Nash model, but not as good 
as both Stackelberg models. The highest  loglikelihood is attained for the Stackelberg female 
leader model. If we use the proportion of correct joint predictions for ym and yf as a measure 
of goodness-of-fit, the Mixed model performs slightly better. The general picture, however, is 
that the differences  between  the various models are small. An explanation is that the cross- 
wage  effects  pick  up most  of  the interdependence between  male  and  female  labour  force 
participation. Apparently, once (cross-) wage effects are controlled for, little room is left for 
direct structural influence as represented by cuf and am. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have estimated and compared various econometric models for simultaneous 
discrete  endogenous  variables.  The  models  are  based  on the  assumption  that  observed 
endogenous variables represent the outcome of a static discrete game. Estimation by means of 
maximum likelihood we  found to be  feasible and produced plausible results,  except  for the 
model based on Pareto optimality only. Apparently, this concept imposes insufficient structure 
on the model to be able to obtain sensible results. 
The models that have been estimated are still relatively simple. For example, each assumes 
that  the  decision  process  within  all  households  can  be  described  by  a  single  equilibrium 
concept. It seems, however, that identification and estimation of more subtle models require 
additional data, particularly on the individual preferences of the players. 
With the insights of game theory becoming central in many areas of economic theory, it is 
now a challenge to exploit these insights in empirical research. This paper has attempted to do 
so in one particular field of applied econometrics: household labour force participation. DISCRETE GAMES ---  ---  --- -  -  - 
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